

Privacy Laws

Jonathan Nuechterlein & Alan Charles Raul Sidley Austin LLP

September 6, 2019

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TALENT. TEAMWORK. RESULTS.


Substance and sources of law applicable to commercial actors

- Subject matter:
 - Privacy:
 - What is personally identifiable information, and how should it be collected, used, and shared?
 - Data security:
 - What measures must be taken to protect consumer data from unauthorized misuse?
 - Data breach reporting:
 - What steps must be taken to inform government authorities and affected consumers once a data breach occurs?
- Sources of law:
 - Federal
 - State/municipal
 - Foreign


Federal privacy/data security statutes: a polyglot

Sector-specific regulation governing commercial actors (a nonexhaustive list):

- Financial data (Gramm Leach Bliley; enforced by various agencies)
- Consumer credit data (FCRA; CFPB and FTC)
- Health data (HIPAA; HHS)
- Children's data (COPPA; FTC)
- Telecommunications services data (Communications Act; FCC)
- Electronic communications (ECPA; DOJ)
- Cable/satellite data (Cable and Satellite Acts; FCC)
- Student education data (FERPA; Dep't of Education)
- ➢ Etc.



Federal privacy/data security statutes: a polyglot (cont'd)



Section 5: overview

- Unlike EU law, the FTC Act uses a retrospective law enforcement model akin to the common law.
- Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 47 U.S.C. § 45(a).
- The FTC deems conduct "deceptive" if it involves misrepresentations or omissions of material information likely to mislead reasonable consumers. Representative FTC cases:
 - *Misrepresentation:* A company tells its customers that it will not sell personally identifiable data to third parties but then does so anyway.
 - Omission: A company offers a mobile app, identifies potential first-party uses of customer data, but fails to mention that the data will be shared with third parties.
- The FTC may deem conduct "unfair" if it "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." *E.g.*:
 - Company X takes unreasonably inadequate steps to protect its customers' credit card data from cybersecurity threats, enabling hackers to obtain the data and harm the customers.

Section 5: procedure, remedies, and new uncertainty

- Absent a settlement, the FTC can bring Section 5 cases either administratively (*e.g.*, *LabMD*) or in federal district court (*e.g.*, *Wyndham*).
- For pure Section 5 cases, the FTC typically sues in federal court if it wishes to recover "equitable monetary relief."
 - Section 13(b) authorizes courts to issue "a permanent injunction" in "proper cases" where a defendant "is violating, or is about to violate," the FTC Act. Starting in the 1980s, lower courts construed this language to permit disgorgement/restitution. But:
 - Intervening Supreme Court decisions draw that approach into question.
 - Citing those decisions, the Seventh Circuit (*Credit Bureau Center*) recently overruled its own precedent and held that Section 13(b) does *not* permit equitable monetary remedies, creating an explicit circuit conflict.
 - Even where such remedies remain legally available, they can be poorly tailored to privacy/data security cases.
- Damages are available only under section 19, and only where "a reasonable man would have known under the circumstances [that the conduct] was dishonest or fraudulent."
- The FTC's civil penalty authority is unavailable for Section 5 violations; it extends only to violations of specific FTC orders (including consent orders) or, in some cases, FTC rules.

FTC notice-and-choice guidance

- The FTC has long endorsed a flexible approach to consumer privacy that targets
 potentially harmful uses of data but does not interfere with the beneficial uses that fuel
 the growth of the commercial internet.
- That flexibility is particularly evident in the FTC's approach to "notice and choice" issues, involving the mechanisms that businesses use to obtain or infer consent to particular data uses.
- Non-binding 2012 FTC *Privacy Report*: Context informs what firms can reasonably infer about consumer expectations.
 - "Most first-party marketing practices are consistent with the consumer's relationship with the business and thus do not necessitate consumer choice."
 - Consent mechanisms for data sharing with third parties (unrelated to the delivery of services or context of collection) depend on data sensitivity:
 - De-identified/aggregated data generally requires no consent mechanism.
 - Personally identifiable data in *sensitive* categories (*e.g.*, medical or financial information) is generally subject to *opt-in* mechanisms.
 - Personally identifiable non-sensitive data is generally subject to opt-out mechanisms.
- Industry self-regulatory groups (e.g., DAA, DMA) have long played a central role in administering this regime.


Foreign privacy laws

- US companies doing business abroad must consider their obligations under foreign as well as US law.
- The EU's General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR"):
 - Is much more prescriptive than the FTC's Section 5 approach.
 - Establishes overbroad (and often ambiguous) limits on the collection, sharing, and use of consumer data. For example, GDPR:
 - Prohibits processing of personal data without a preexisting lawful basis (such as consent, contract, legal obligation, or "legitimate interest").
 - Requires opt-in consent mechanisms in a broad range of contexts involving "automated processing," even for uncontroversial uses of non-sensitive data. This inhibits, *e.g.*, innovations in AI and in data analytics tools needed to detect cybersecurity events.
 - Imposes highly detailed notice requirements, resulting in privacy notices that are paradoxically more difficult for ordinary consumers to read and understand.
 - Regulates when and how data may be transferred between the EU and other jurisdictions (such as the US).
 - Imposes major financial penalties for violations.
- In the wake of GDPR, other major US trading partners (e.g., India) have begun considering EU-like privacy laws of their own.

State data breach laws

- Apart from certain sector-specific laws, federal law imposes no specific requirements governing how companies must report and remediate data breaches.
- In contrast, all 50 states do have data-breach laws.
- Those laws vary in many different respects. E.g.,
 - Which entities are covered?
 - What types of breached information are covered?
 - What constitutes a "breach": unauthorized *access* or unauthorized *acquisition*?
 - Does a breach need to threaten concrete harm before reporting is required?
 - How quickly must affected customers be notified?
 - Do state regulators need to be notified?
- Until very recently, state privacy/data security law generally focused only on these breach-notification requirements.
- But ...

The Times They Are a-Changin'




The California Consumer Privacy Act

• The CCPA imposes far-reaching privacy and data-protection obligations on companies that "do business" in California.

2020	Adopted in 2018; will come into force Jan. 2020.		On request, companies must provide personal information they have collected about a customer and, with some exceptions, delete it.
	Applies to certain for-profit entities doing business in California and defines personal information very broadly.	<u>*</u>	Creates private cause of action for data breaches and authorizes damage awards without proof of harm.
	Broad privacy policy disclosure requirements.	\$	Authorizes California Attorney General to enforce provisions with statutory fines.

- The CCPA was passed very quickly, in response to a ballot initiative.
- The California legislature has already amended it once to fix the most obvious problems, with more amendments anticipated.
- The California AG must then provide post-enactment regulatory guidance on the meaning of critical but ambiguous provisions.

Relevant amendments in play



California's GDPR? Key similarities and differences

	Торіс	Key CCPA	Significan Certain key Generally fev Key	al CCPA Obligations Relative to G t incremental obligations between C(y incremental obligations between C(v incremental obligations between C(Top-Line Comparison (Does	CPA and GDPR CPA and GDPR CPA and GDPR		Responsibilities for Processors	§ 17 8.140(d)	Article 28	No directly comparable CCPA provision although, third parties who buy PI cannot sell it without providing notice and opt-out. Also, businesses must disclose constumer PI pursuant to a written contract.			Rectification Right to object to processing Right not to be subject to	N/A N/A N/A	Article 16 Article 21 Article 22	The GDPR also provides data privacy rights of rectification, to object to processing and not be subject to automated processing, but there is <u>no directly</u> <u>comparable CCPA provision</u> .	0
		Provisions	GDPR Provisions	Not Address Every Distinction)	CCPA Obligations Relative to GDPR	<u>Rights</u>	Notice	§ 17 8.100(b) § 17 8.130 § 17 8.135(a)	Articles 12–14	Substantial overlap as both the GDPR and the CCPA require information be provided to individuals such as categories of personal data and purposes although, the specifics of compliance may differ and the CCPA expressly requires affirmative notice of the categories of PI to be collected. The CCPA has "Do Not Sell My Personal Information" labelling requirement.	0	Enforcement Provisions	automated processing Government	§ 1 98.155	Article 58	The GDPR appears to be broader,	
Threshold Conditions	Effective data Covered entities	2020 § 17 8.140(c) § 17 8.145	25 May, 2018 Article 3	N/A Different territorial scopes: although, both the GDPR and the CCPA have broad scopes, the CCPA applies to profit organisations that collect or sell personal information (PI) on California residents while	0								Enforcement	§ 1 20.133	Article 83	The ODT is appears to be down. with fines of up to 4% of global annual turnover and broader regulatory powers. Under the CCPA, civil penalties can be issued by a court which, depending on violation, can be \$2,500 for each violation or \$7,500 for each intentional violation. (NOTE: The CCPA	
				conducting business in California and includes various exceptions (e.g., certain small entities, specific industries).			Right of access	§ 17 8.100	Article 15 Article 20	Largely the same as both the GDPR and the CCPA provide a right of access although, the GDPR provides access to additional information and the compliance requirements and ability to charge may differ. Also, under the CCPA, right only applies to PI collected in the 12 months prior to request.			Private Cause of Action	A	Article 77 Article 79	enforcement funded by fines.) The GDPR appears to be much broader, with claims covering both material and non-material damages. The CCPA provides a powerful but limited cause of action, with statutory damages of at least \$100 per person.	\otimes
	Definition of covered information	§ 17 8.140(o)	Article 4	Similar practical impact as the GDPR and the CCPA apply to PI: although, the CCPA explicitly applies to information associated with a "household", but there are	Ø												
	Inferred	8	Article 4	specific exclusions such as for publicly available information. Definitions similar, but the CCPA			Right to be forgotten	§ 17 8.105(a)	Article 17	The GDPR is broader, as although the right to be forgotten is similar, the exceptions are quite different.		ovisions	Data Protection Officer (DPO)	N/A	Articles 37–39	<u>No directly comparable CCPA</u> <u>provision</u> . The GDPR requires the appointment of a DPO in certain cases.	0
	information	1798.140(o)(K)	Article 22	definition of PI includes "inferences drawn from" information to "create a profile about a consumer", while the GDPR's definition of personal data includes information that relates to an identified/identifiable		-	Right to "opt out" for third- party sale	§ 17 8.120(a)	Article 7	Similar practical impact, as although the GDPR does not have a provision which specifically addresses this issue, the ability to withdraw consent under the GDPR likely provides a similar right.	•	Security and other Provisions	Security Requirements	N/A	Article 32	The GDPR requires controllers implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security. <u>No</u> <u>directly comparable CCPA</u> <u>provision</u> , although California has	0
	Covered activities	§ 17 8.140(e and t)	Article 2	individual. <u>GDPR appears broader</u> as it applies to "processing" whereas, the CCPA is mainly focused on the "collection" and "sale" of PI.			Children	§ 17 8.120(b)	Article 8	Similar although, the GDPR does not differentiate between ages 0– 13 and 13–16 and relies on EU Member State law. The CCPA allows children's PI to be "sold" only on the basis of consent.		SOI .	Recordkeeping	N/A	Article 30	a separate data security statute. The GDPR requires a controller to maintain a record of processing activities. <u>No directly comparable</u> <u>CCPA provision</u> .	0
	Conditions for processing	pr N/A	Articles 5(1)(e), 6(1)	The GDPR provides processing of personal data must be based on one of six grounds. <u>No directly</u> comparable CCPA provision although consumers may ask businesses not to sell their PI.	0		Non- discrimination	§ 17 8.125	N/A	No directly comparable GDPR provision although, the practical implications of the CCPA are unclear. The CCPA provides constumers must not be discriminated because of the execution of their rights under the CCPA.	S		Breach Notification	§ 17 8.150	Articles 33–34	The GDPR requires a controller to report a personal data breach without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after becoming aware of it. <u>No</u> <u>directly comparable CCPA</u> <u>provision</u> , although notification requirements exist in parts of California law.	

Amendments and regulatory guidance



Après California, le déluge?

- Nevada recently enacted privacy legislation with provisions similar to California's but distinct in several respects.
- Many other States are also considering broad privacy legislation, including New York, Washington, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Utah, North Dakota, and Hawaii.
- Even some cities, including Chicago, are considering enactment of privacy ordinances with potentially nationwide effects.
- The likely result: a patchwork quilt of privacy obligations that vary greatly from state to state and even from city to city, defying the geography-agnostic nature of the internet.
- That hodgepodge is much more problematic for *privacy* regulation than for *data-breach* reporting requirements.
 - State-by-state variation in breach-reporting rules merely increases the number of lawyer hours needed to respond to a breach.
 - State-by-state variation in privacy regulation creates substantial regulatory uncertainty and impairs the efficiency of a company's underlying business.

Prospects for federal privacy legislation

- There is broad agreement on the need for federal legislation.
 - A broad spectrum of interested parties from industry representatives to civil libertarians agree that new federal privacy legislation is needed.
 - Consumers and businesses would benefit from greater certainty and consistency in legal requirements.
- The positive aspects of the CCPA can be preserved, but also refined and improved.
 - The CCPA properly recognizes the value of privacy and the importance of standards that apply consistently across all industry sectors.
 - But federal legislation can establish easier-to-implement and nationally consistent standards establishing general consumer rights:
 - to know what data is collected about them and how it is used;
 - to control how such data is accessed or used; and
 - to be presented with opt-in or opt-out mechanisms for data-sharing with third parties, depending on context-specific variables such as data sensitivity.

First principles for federal legislation

- Preserve innovation by avoiding excessively prescriptive requirements that cannot adapt to changing technologies (*cf.* GDPR and AI).
- Apply the same cost-benefit analysis the FTC has long applied to promote consumer interests while protecting data's role in fueling the information economy. *E.g.*, focus on genuine risks to consumers and distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive data.
- Preserve the geography-agnostic nature of the internet by establishing national consistency in privacy rules.
- Vest primary implementation authority in the FTC and augment its funding to support its expanded role.
- To the extent that FTC rulemaking is needed in discrete contexts, authorize the FTC to employ standard APA procedures.
- Extend FTC civil penalty authority to appropriate privacy/data-security cases involving violations of Section 5.
- Authorize state AGs to play an enforcement role by bringing actions on behalf of their citizens (*cf.* state AG role under HIPAA and COPPA).
- Rely on these governmental authorities (rather than plaintiffs' lawyers) to enforce the terms of the legislation.

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